

## **Curriculum Vitae**

Professor Eberhard Feess

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### *Personal Details*

Name: Eberhard Feess  
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Date of birth: 22 May 1959  
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### *Employment History*

#### Current Position

- March 2018- present Full Professor of Economics at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand

#### Former academic positions

- 2008 –2018 Professor of Managerial Economics at Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
- 2001 – 2008 Professor of Microeconomics at the Technical University of Aachen (RWTH)
- 1996 – 2001 Professor of Law & Economics at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt
- 1994 – 1996 Professor of Industrial Organization at European Business School in Oestrich-Winkel

### *Educational History*

- 1993 Habilitation in Economics (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1988 PhD in Sociology (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1987 Diploma in Economics (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1986 Diploma in Sociology (Goethe University Frankfurt)

### *Professional experience, research projects and consultancy (EXAMPLES)*

- Advisor for the GIZ (German state agency for international cooperation in developing countries) for competition policy, in particular by supporting the draft of competition

laws and by advising case handling in competition agencies (e.g. in Georgia, Armenia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines)

- Advisor of the Bundeskartellamt (German competition agency); in particular on detecting cartels in procurement auctions
- Research projects funded e.g. by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German National Research Foundation), VW Foundation and Thyssen Foundation on various topics
- Consulting projects e.g. for Deutsche Lufthansa, VW, Generali and Aventis

## Publications

### *Articles in refereed Journals*

**Note: Monographs, others and publications before 1998 omitted due to 3-page restriction)**

1. 'Judicial effort and the appeal system: Theory and experiment' (with Roe Sarel), *The Journal of Legal Studies* (2019), forthcoming.
2. Behavioral red flags and loss sizes from asset misappropriation: Evidence from the US' (with Yuriy Timofeyev), *Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research*, (2019), forthcoming.
3. 'Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation' (with Florian Kerzenmacher), *Games & Economic Behavior* (2018), Vol. 111, September, 274-288.
4. 'The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory' (with Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel), *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 149 (2018), pp. 58-73.
5. 'Reimbursement schemes for hospitals: The impact of case and firm characteristics' (with Helge Mueller and Ansgar Wohlschlegel), *Applied Economics*, (2018), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00036846.2018.1528334>.
6. 'Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation' (with Ansgar Wohlschlegel), *Journal of Regulatory Economics* (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9352-3>.
7. 'Moral hazard, risk sharing, and the optimal pool size' (with Frauke von Bieberstein, José F. Fernando, Florian Kerzenmacher and Jörg Schiller), *The Journal of Risk and Insurance* (2017), DOI: 10.1111/jori.1221.
8. 'Do capitation-based reimbursement systems underfund tertiary healthcare providers? Evidence from New Zealand (with Somi Shin, and Christoph Schumacher, *Health Economics* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3478>.
9. 'Ability, team composition, and moral hazard: Evidence from the laboratory' (with D. Doll, and A. Mohnen), *Schmalenbach Business Review*, 18, 1 (2017), pp. 49-70.
10. 'Academic copyright in the publishing game: A contest perspective' (with M. Scheufen), *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 42, 2 (2016), pp. 263-294.
11. 'Estimating risk preferences of bettors with different bet sizes' (with H. Müller and C. Schumacher), *European Journal of Operational Research*, 249, 3 (2016), pp. 1102-1112.
12. 'Fixed fee licensing for cost-reducing technologies: Should innovators reveal their private information?' (with S. Gleave), *Review of Managerial Science*, 10, 4 (2016), pp. 781-799.

13. 'The impact of ability, rank and gender on risk-taking in contests: Evidence from the Ski World Cup' (with P. Jost, and H. Müller), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 172, 4 (2016), pp. 573-614.
14. 'Contracts as rent-seeking devices: Evidence from German soccer' (with M. Gerfin and G. Mühlheuser), *Economic inquiry*, 53, 1 (2015), pp. 714-730.
15. 'Implementing efficient market structures: The role of information transmission' (with M. Paust), *FinanzArchiv*, 71, 2 (2015), pp. 240-277.
16. 'On the interplay of public and private law enforcement with multiple victims', *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 39, 1 (2015), pp. 79-95.
17. 'The determinants of environmental awareness: A multilevel analysis including value systems' (with S. Ruhnau), *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht*, Jg. 38, 2 (2015), pp. 147-184.
18. 'Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis' (with J. Thun), *European Journal of Operational Research*, 234, 3 (2014), pp. 763-773.
19. 'The German capital markets model case act (KapMuG): A European role model for increasing the efficiency of capital markets? Analysis and suggestions for reform' (with A. Halfmeier), *European Journal of Finance* 20, 4 (2014), pp. 361-379.
20. 'The favorite-longshot bias and the impact of experience' (with H. Müller, and C. Schumacher), *Business Research* 7, 2 (2014), pp. 217-234.
21. 'The impact of religion and the degree of religiosity on work ethic: A multilevel analysis' (with H. Müller, and S. Ruhnau), *Kyklos* 67, 4 (2014), pp. 506-534.
22. Bannier, C., Feess, E. and Packham, N. (2013). Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry, *Review of Finance*, Vol. 17(2), pp. 653-690.
23. Feess, E. (2013). Negligence standards and care levels when damages depend on sales prices, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 36(2), pp. 389-405.
24. Feess, E. and Schumacher, C. (2013). The Elasticity of Demand for Wagering in an Unregulated Market, *Applied Economics*, Vol. 45(15), pp. 2083-2091.
25. Feess, E. (2012). Malpractice liability, technology choice and negative defensive medicine, *European Journal of Health Economics*, Vol. 13(2), pp. 157-167.
26. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2012). The Basel II Accord: Internal Ratings and Bank Differentiation, *Review of Finance*, Vol. 16(4), pp. 1043-1092.
27. Feess, E., Peren Arin, K., Chmelarova, V. and Ansgar Wohlschlegel, A. (2011). Why Are Corrupt Countries Less Successful in Consolidating Their Budgets?, *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 95(7/8), pp. 521-530.
28. Feess, E., Schieble, M. and Walzl, M. (2011). When it pays to conceal- on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information, *German Economic Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 100-123.
29. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2010). Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 166 (4), pp. 573-590.
30. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2011). Screening in courts: On the joint use of causation and negligence standards, *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, Vol. 27(2), pp. 350-75.
31. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2010). All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division, *Review of Industrial Organization*, Vol. 37(3), pp. 161-178.

32. Feess, E. (2010). Die gemeinsame Nutzung von Auflagen und Haftungsregeln bei ungeklärter Kausalität, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht*.
33. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 104(2), pp. 69–71.
34. Feess, E. and Stähler, F. (2009). Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues, *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 56(2), pp. 255-265.
35. Feess, E., Lorz, O. and Höck, M. (2009). International Technology Transfers and Competition, *Review of International Economics*, Vol. 17(5), pp. 1038- 1052.
36. Feess, E., Baum, I. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Reporter's privilege and incentives to leak, *Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 5(1), pp. 701-715.
37. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Environmental Liability under Uncertain Causation, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 28(2), pp. 133-148.
38. Feess, E., Altintig, A. and Arin, K.P. (2009). You are one of us now! How do share prices of rivals react to privatization, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. 57(2), pp. 265–293.
39. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Walzl, M. (2009). Auctions with handicaps, *Journal of Economics*.
40. Feess, E. and Ossig, S. (2007). Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 27(4), pp. 423-441.
41. Feess, E. and Gleave, S. (2006). Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination, *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 4(10), pp. 1-10.
42. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2006). Liability and Information Transmission, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 92, pp. 63-67.
43. Feess, E. and Schumacher, C. (2006). Why Costless Auditing May Reduce Social Welfare, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 90, pp. 407-411.
44. Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting (with M. Walzl), in: *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 162, 2, 2006, 277-290.
45. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2005). Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values, *International Tax and Public Finance*, Vol. 12, pp. 265-279.
46. Feess, E., Ossig, S. and Walzl, M. (2005). The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent Model, *Schmalenbachs Business Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 234-246.
47. Feess, E. (2005). Bosman und die Folgen - was lernen wir aus der Empirie? *Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht*, Vol. 2, pp. 365-377.
48. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2004). Optimal Law Enforcement and Self-Reporting when there are Criminal Teams, *Economica*, Vol. 71, pp. 703-710.
49. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2004). Delegated Expertise – When are Good Projects Bad News? *Economics Letters*, Vol. 82, pp. 77-82.
50. Feess, E. (2003). Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 645-668.

51. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2003). The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 105, pp. 139-154.
52. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, pp. 221-237.
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54. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2002). Safety Regulation and Monitor Liability, *Review of Economic Design*, Vol.7, pp. 173-185.
55. Feess, E. and Heesen, E. (2002). Self-Reporting with Ex-Post Asymmetric Information, *Journal of Economics*, Vol. 77(2), pp. 141-153.
56. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve, *Environmental and Resource Economics*, Vol. 23, pp. 149-166.
57. Feess, E. and Nell, M. (2002). Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 158(3), pp. 408-419.
58. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Auswirkungen des neuen Transfersystems auf den europäischen Fussball: Eine mikroökonomische Analyse, *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftslehre*, Vol. 4, pp. 143-162.
59. Feess, E., Ewert, R. and Nell, M. (2000). Auditor Liability Rules under Imperfect Information and Costly Litigation, *European Accounting Review*, Vol. 9(3), pp. 371-385.
60. Feess, E., Ewert, R. and Nell, M. (2000). Prüfungsqualität, Dritthaftung und Versicherung, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis*, Vol. 6, pp. 158-172.
61. Feess, E. and Taistra, G. (2000). The Porter Hypothesis on Environmental Policy in an Oligopoly Model with Cost Asymmetry Caused by Innovation, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 220/0.
62. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2000). Settling Multiparty Accidents under Incomplete Information, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 20, pp. 255-324.
63. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2000). Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility, *Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance*, Vol. 25(2), pp. 220-234.
64. Feess, E. (1999). Lender Liability for Environmental Harm - an Argument Against Negligence Rules, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 8, pp. 231-250.
65. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (1999). The Role of Insurance in the Adjudication of Multi-Party Accidents, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 19(1), pp. 69-86.
66. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (1999). Strategic Environmental Policy and the Learning Curve- the Significance of the Environmental Industry, *Review of Economics*, Vol. 50, pp. 178-194.
67. Feess, E. and Seeliger (1999). Konsequenzen eines Ausstiegs aus der Kernenergie – Ein Kritischer Vergleich vorhandener Studien, *Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung*, Vol.12, pp. 400-407.