

## Principles of Economics Syllabus

<b>Course title</b>	Principles of Economics
<b>Course code</b>	29020
<b>Scientific sector</b>	SECS P/01
<b>Degree</b>	PhD Programme in Management and Economics
<b>Semester and academic year</b>	1st and 2nd semester 2017-2018
<b>Year</b>	1st
<b>Credits</b>	5
<b>Modular</b>	No

<b>Total lecturing hours</b>	30
<b>Total office hours</b>	On request
<b>Total exercise hours</b>	Not foreseen
<b>Attendance</b>	Required
<b>Prerequisites</b>	<p>Basic knowledge of undergraduate microeconomic theory and mathematics for economists. In particular, students are suggested to review the main basic concepts that will be further formally developed through the course.</p> <p>Both suggested textbooks below are standard in any economic undergraduate program and should be available from the library at your university. Please, review the chapters suggested before the course starts.</p> <p>Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach. Seventh edition, WW Norton &amp; Co., 2005.  Chapter 3: Preferences;  Chapter 4: Utility;  Chapter 5: Choice;  Chapter 6: Demand;  Chapter 7: Revealed Preference;  Chapter 12: Uncertainty;  Chapter 19: Profit Maximization;  Chapter 20: Cost Minimization;  Chapter 28: Game Theory;  Chapter 29: Game Applications;  Chapter 31: Exchange;  Chapter 37: Asymmetric Information.</p> <p>David M Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.  Chapter 2: The theory of consumer choice and demand (except 2.4.);  Chapter 3: Choice under uncertainty;  Chapter 6: Pure exchange and general equilibrium (except 6.5.);</p>

	<p>Chapter 7: The neoclassical firm (except 7.5.);  Chapter 11: Modeling competitive situations;  Chapter 12: Solution concepts for noncooperative games (except 12.7 and 12.8);  Chapter 17: Adverse selection and market signaling;</p> <p>Standard mathematical concepts and basic proofs can be found in:  Knut Sydsaeter and Peter J. Hammond, Mathematics for Economic Analysis. First edition, Pearson, 1995.</p>
<b>Course page</b>	<a href="https://www.unibz.it/en/faculties/economics-management/academic-staff/person/12115-francisco-javier-santos-arteaga">https://www.unibz.it/en/faculties/economics-management/academic-staff/person/12115-francisco-javier-santos-arteaga</a>

<b>Specific educational objectives</b>	<p>The course provides an in-depth discussion of key concepts of microeconomic theory ranging from individual decision making and choice under risk and uncertainty to theories of strategic interaction. Central theoretical concepts and proof techniques of modern microeconomic theory will be discussed and applied. Students will acquire</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a working-knowledge of the formal concepts and techniques such that important branches of the contemporary economics and management literature become accessible;</li> <li>• the logical fundamentals and mathematical competences required to foresee applications to a variety of research areas, such as Knowledge Management and Operations Research.</li> </ul>
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<b>Lecturer</b>	Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga <a href="mailto:fsantosarteaga@unibz.it">fsantosarteaga@unibz.it</a>
<b>Scientific sector of the lecturer</b>	SECS P/01
<b>Teaching language</b>	English
<b>Office hours</b>	Please refer to the lecturer's web page
<b>Lecturing assistant</b>	None
<b>List of topics covered</b>	<p>Session 1: Preferences</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preference relations</li> <li>- Rationality</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 1 A-B</li> </ul> <p>Session 2: Choice and Utility</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coice rules</li> <li>- Utility representation</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 1 C-D</li> </ul> <p>Session 3: Consumer Choice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rational choice and rationalizability</li> <li>- Weak axiom of revealed preference</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 2 A-D, F</li> </ul>

	<p>Session 4: Demand Theory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Consumer preferences</li> <li>- Consumer choice</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 3 A-C</li> </ul> <p>Session 5: Optimal demand</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Utility maximization</li> <li>- Expenditure minimization</li> <li>- Welfare</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 3 D-E, I</li> </ul> <p>Session 6: Production</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Production sets</li> <li>- Profit maximization</li> <li>- Cost minimization</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 5 A-C</li> </ul> <p>Session 7: General Equilibrium</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pure exchange economies</li> <li>- Basics: One consumer and one producer</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 15 A-C</li> </ul> <p>Session 8: Equilibrium Welfare Properties</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Equilibrium and welfare</li> <li>- The first theorem of welfare economics</li> <li>- The second theorem of welfare economics</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 15 D, 16 A-D</li> </ul> <p>Session 9: Choices under Uncertainty</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- von Neumann-Morgenstern axiomatization</li> <li>- Expected utility theory</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 6 A-B</li> </ul> <p>Session 10: Attitudes towards Risk</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Measures of risk attitudes</li> <li>- Stochastic dominance</li> <li>- State-dependent utility</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 6 C-E</li> </ul> <p>Session 11: Basics of Game Theory</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rational behavior and game theory</li> <li>- Extensive Form Games</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 7 B-C, OR ch. 1</li> </ul> <p>Session 12: Strategic Form Games</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rationalizability</li> <li>- Dominant and dominated strategies</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 8 B-C, OR ch. 2.1, 4.1, 4.2</li> </ul> <p>Session 13: Nash equilibrium</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nash equilibrium existence</li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strictly competitive games</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 8 D, OR ch. 2.2-2.5</li> </ul> <p>Session 14: Mixed Strategies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium</li> <li>- Interpretations</li> <li>- Literature: OR ch. 3.1-3.2</li> </ul> <p>Session 15: Games with Incomplete Information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Perfect and imperfect information</li> <li>- Bayesian Nash equilibrium</li> <li>- Literature: MCWG ch. 8 E, OR ch. 2.6</li> </ul>
<b>Teaching format</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Students are advised to read the literature indicated in the description of the topics being covered as a preparation for a session.</li> <li>• In particular, it will prove useful to try to anticipate those instances where it may be difficult to follow the presentation -- this is not an uncommon experience when exposed to the theoretical literature.</li> <li>• Making a joint effort to overcome these difficulties is the main objective of the lectures, where key concepts from the literature complemented by additional material are presented and discussed.</li> <li>• Special emphasis will be given to a step-by-step discussion of the proofs and a thorough assessment of conceptual aspects and their potential applications.</li> </ul>
<b>Learning outcomes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Developing the ability to formalize economic environments building on the central theoretical concepts and proof techniques of modern microeconomic theory.</li> <li>- Acquiring the necessary skills to understand and deal with the modelization of rational decision making processes.</li> <li>- Engaging in thorough discussions of key formal microeconomic concepts ranging from individual decision making under risk and uncertainty to theories of strategic interaction.</li> <li>- Understanding the relationship existing between a proof and its related economic intuition.</li> </ul>
<b>Assessment</b>	<p>Grading will be based on the following evaluation criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The completion of assignments to be handed in through the lectures and solved in class.</li> <li>• An essay formalizing a problem discussed in any of your other PhD courses or current economic events dealing with preferences, choices, exchange or strategic interactions.</li> <li>• A final exam.</li> </ul>
<b>Assessment language</b>	English

<b>Evaluation criteria and criteria for awarding marks</b>	In order to pass this course, you need a grade of at least 5 out of 10 points in each of the required evaluation criteria.
<b>Required readings</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. and Green, J. (MCWG), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.</li> <li>- Osborne, M. and Rubinstein, A. (OR), A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.</li> </ul>
<b>Supplementary readings</b>	<p><b>Microeconomic Theory</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Varian, H., Microeconomic Analysis, Third Edition, WW Norton &amp; Co., 1992.</li> <li>- Jehle, G.A. and Reny, P.J., Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Third Edition, Pearson, 2011.</li> <li>- Rubinstein, A., Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, 2016.</li> </ul> <p><b>Game Theory</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Osborne, M., An Introduction to Game Theory, First Edition, Oxford University Press, 2003.</li> <li>- Maschler, M., Solan, E. and S. Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.</li> </ul> <p><b>Risk and Uncertainty</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Gilboa, I., Theory of Decision under Uncertainty, Cambridge University Press, 2009.</li> </ul>