

Curriculum Vitae
Professor Eberhard Feess

Employment History

Current Position

- March 2018- present Professor of Economics at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand

Former academic positions

- 2008 –2018 Professor of Managerial Economics at Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
- 2001 – 2008 Professor of Microeconomics at the Technical University of Aachen (RWTH)
- 1996 – 2001 Professor of Law & Economics at Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt
- 1994 – 1996 Professor of Industrial Organization at European Business School in Oestrich-Winkel

Educational History

- 1993 Habilitation in Economics (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1988 PhD in Sociology (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1987 Diploma in Economics (Goethe University Frankfurt)
- 1986 Diploma in Sociology (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Research Focus

Law & Economics, Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Competition Policy, Sports Economics

Professional experience, research projects and consultancy (EXAMPLES)

- Consulting projects for many companies including e.g. for Deutsche Lufthansa, VW, and Generali.
- Advisor for the GIZ (German state agency for international cooperation in developing countries) for competition policy, in particular by supporting the draft of competition laws and by advising case handling in competition agencies (e.g. in Georgia, Armenia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines) from 2008-2020.
- Expert witness for court decisions in competition cases in Germany since 2021.

- Advisor for the Bundeskartellamt (German competition agency) on detecting cartels in procurement auctions (2005-2010).
- Research projects funded e.g. by VW Foundation, Thyssen Foundation, and the German Science Foundation (DFG) on various topics.

Publications

Articles in refereed Journals

1. **Feess, E.**, and Kerzenmacher, F. (2023): Sorting of trustees: The good and the bad stay in the game, *Economic Theory*, 2023.
2. **Feess, E.**, Kerzenmacher, F., and Muehlheusser, G. (2023): Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives, *Games and Economic Behavior*, Vol. 140, July 2023, 380-400.
3. Dudek, T., **Feess, E.**, and Timofeyev, Y. (2023): Misreporting in teams with individual decision making: the impact of information and communication, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, Vol. 209, May 2023, 509-532.
4. Becher, S., **Feess, E.** and Sarel, R. (2023): Regulating Product Return Policies: The Trade-off between Efficiency and Distribution, *The Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 52, January 2023, 137-191.
5. **Feess, E.**, Kerzenmacher, F. and Yuriy Timofeyev (2022): Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior -- what predicts moral transgressions?, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 149, October 2022, 104-125
6. **Feess, E.** and Sarel, R. (2022): Optimal fine reductions for self-reporting: The impact of loss aversion, *International Review of Law and Economics*, 2022, Vol. 70, June 2022, 106067.
7. **Feess, E.**, Feld, J. and S. Noy (2021). People judge discrimination against women more harshly than discrimination against men – does statistical fairness discrimination explain why?, *Frontiers in Psychology*, 2021; 12: 675776.
8. Bose, P., **Feess, E.** and H. Müller (2021): Favoritism towards high-status clubs: Evidence from German soccer, *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, August 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab005>
9. Bannier, C., **Feess, E.**, Packham, N. and M. Walzl (2021). Differentiation and Risk Aversion in Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 212, pp. 273-310.
10. Buechel, B., **Feess, E.**, Muehlheusser, G. (2020). Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naïve offenders, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 177 pp. 836-857.
11. **Feess, E.**, M.V. Levati, M. Rieser and I. Soraperra (2020). High-powered contracts, self-selection, and excessive risk taking in settings with externalities: Evidence from the laboratory, *Economica*, 87(346):328-363
12. **Feess, E.** and Yuriy Timofeyev (2020): Behavioral red flags and loss sizes from asset misappropriation: Evidence from the US', *Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research*, 23:77-117.
13. **Feess, E.**, C. Grund, M. Walzl and A. Wohlschlegel (2020). Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice, *European Journal of Operational Research*, 280(3):1108-1121
14. Dato, S., **Feess, E.** and Nieken, P (2019). Lying and Reciprocity, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 118, S. 193-218
15. Arin, K.P., **Feess, E.**, Kuhlenkasper, T. and Reich, O. (2019). Negotiating with Terrorists: The Costs of Compliance, *Southern Economic Journal*, 83, 305-317.
16. **Feess, E.** and R. Sarel: Judicial effort and the appeal system: Theory and experiment', *The Journal of Legal Studies* (2019), 47, 2.

17. **Feess, E.** and Florian Kerzenmacher: Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation', *Games & Economic Behavior* (2018), Vol. 111, September, 274-288.
18. **Feess, E.**, Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch, Markus Schramm and Ansgar Wohlschlegel: The impact of fine size and uncertainty on punishment and deterrence: Theory and evidence from the laboratory', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 149 (2018), pp. 58-73.
19. **Feess, E.**, Helge Mueller and Ansgar Wohlschlegel): Reimbursement schemes for hospitals: The impact of case and firm characteristics' *Applied Economics*, (2018), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00036846.2018.1528334>.
20. **Feess, E.** and Ansgar Wohlschlegel): Bank capital requirements and mandatory deferral of compensation' *Journal of Regulatory Economics* (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9352-3>.
21. 'Moral hazard, risk sharing, and the optimal pool size' (with Frauke von Bieberstein, José F. Fernando, Florian Kerzenmacher and Jörg Schiller), *The Journal of Risk and Insurance* (2017), DOI: 10.1111/jori.1221.
22. 'Do capitation-based reimbursement systems underfund tertiary healthcare providers? Evidence from New Zealand (with Somi Shin, and Christoph Schumacher, *Health Economics* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3478>.
23. 'Ability, team composition, and moral hazard: Evidence from the laboratory' (with D. Doll, and A. Mohnen), *Schmalenbach Business Review*, 18, 1 (2017), pp. 49-70.
24. 'Academic copyright in the publishing game: A contest perspective' (with M. Scheufen), *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 42, 2 (2016), pp. 263-294.
25. 'Estimating risk preferences of bettors with different bet sizes' (with H. Müller and C. Schumacher), *European Journal of Operational Research*, 249, 3 (2016), pp. 1102-1112.
26. 'Fixed fee licensing for cost-reducing technologies: Should innovators reveal their private information?' (with S. Gleave), *Review of Managerial Science*, 10, 4 (2016), pp. 781-799.
27. 'The impact of ability, rank and gender on risk-taking in contests: Evidence from the Ski World Cup' (with P. Jost, and H. Müller), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 172, 4 (2016), pp. 573-614.
28. 'Contracts as rent-seeking devices: Evidence from German soccer' (with M. Gerfin and G. Mühlheuß), *Economic inquiry*, 53, 1 (2015), pp. 714-730.
29. 'Implementing efficient market structures: The role of information transmission' (with M. Paust), *FinanzArchiv*, 71, 2 (2015), pp. 240-277.
30. 'On the interplay of public and private law enforcement with multiple victims', *European Journal of Law and Economics*, 39, 1 (2015), pp. 79-95.
31. 'The determinants of environmental awareness: A multilevel analysis including value systems' (with S. Ruhnu), *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht*, Jg. 38, 2 (2015), pp. 147-184.
32. 'Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis' (with J. Thun), *European Journal of Operational Research*, 234, 3 (2014), pp. 763-773.
33. 'The German capital markets model case act (KapMuG): A European role model for increasing the efficiency of capital markets? Analysis and suggestions for reform' (with A. Halfmeier), *European Journal of Finance* 20, 4 (2014), pp. 361-379.
34. 'The favorite-longshot bias and the impact of experience' (with H. Müller, and C. Schumacher), *Business Research* 7, 2 (2014), pp. 217-234.
35. 'The impact of religion and the degree of religiosity on work ethic: A multilevel analysis' (with H. Müller, and S. Ruhnu), *Kyklos* 67, 4 (2014), pp. 506-534.
36. Bannier, C., Feess, E. and Packham, N.(2013). Competition, Bonuses, and Risk-Taking in the Banking Industry, *Review of Finance*, Vol. 17(2), pp. 653-690.
37. Feess, E. (2013). Negligence standards and care levels when damages depend on sales prices, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 36(2), pp. 389-405.
38. Feess, E. and Schumacher, C. (2013). The Elasticity of Demand for Wagering in an Unregulated Market, *Applied Economics*, Vol. 45(15), pp. 2083-2091.
39. Feess, E. (2012). Malpractice liability, technology choice and negative defensive medicine, *European Journal of Health Economics*, Vol. 13(2), pp. 157-167.

40. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2012). The Basel II Accord: Internal Ratings and Bank Differentiation, *Review of Finance*, Vol. 16(4), pp. 1043-1092.
41. Feess, E., Peren Arin, K. Chmelarova, V., and Ansgar Wohlschlegel, A. (2011). Why Are Corrupt Countries Less Successful in Consolidating Their Budgets?, *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 95(7/8), pp. 521-530.
42. Feess, E., Schieble, M. and Walzl, M. (2011). When it pays to conceal- on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information, *German Economic Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 100-123.
43. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2010). Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 166 (4), pp. 573-590.
44. Feess, E., Mühlheusser, G. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2011). Screening in courts: On the joint use of causation and negligence standards, *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, Vol. 27(2), pp. 350-75.
45. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2010). All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division, *Review of Industrial Organization*, Vol. 37(3), pp. 161-178.
46. Feess, E. (2010). Die gemeinsame Nutzung von Auflagen und Haftungsregeln bei ungeklärter Kausalität, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik*.
47. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 104(2), pp. 69–71.
48. Feess, E. and Stähler, F. (2009). Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues, *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 56(2), pp. 255-265.
49. Feess, E., Lorz, O. and Höck, M. (2009). International Technology Transfers and Competition, *Review of International Economics*, Vol. 17(5), pp. 1038- 1052.
50. Feess, E., Baum, I. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2009). Reporter's privilege and incentives to leak, *Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 5(1), pp. 701-715.
51. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Wohlscheleg, A. (2009). Environmental Liability under Uncertain Causation, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 28(2), pp. 133-148.
52. Feess, E., Altintig, A. and Arin, K.P. (2009). You are one of us now! How do share prices of rivals react to privatization, *Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. 57(2), pp. 265–293.
53. Feess, E., Mühlheuser, G. and Walzl, M. (2009). Auctions with handicaps, *Journal of Economics*.
54. Feess, E. and Ossig, S. (2007). Reimbursement schemes for hospitals, malpractice liability, and intrinsic motivation, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 27(4), pp. 423-441.
55. Feess, E. and Gleave, S. (2006). Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination, *Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 4(10), pp. 1-10.
56. Feess, E. and Wohlschlegel, A. (2006). Liability and Information Transmission, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 92, pp. 63-67.
57. Feess, E. and Schumacher, C. (2006). Why Costless Auditing May Reduce Social Welfare, *Economics Letters*, Vol. 90, pp. 407-411.
58. Heterogeneity and Optimal Self-Reporting (with M. Walzl), in: *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 162, 2, 2006, 277-290.
59. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2005). Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values, *International Tax and Public Finance*, Vol. 12, pp. 265-279.
60. Feess, E., Ossig, S. and Walzl, M. (2005). The Impact of Truth-Telling and Limited Wealth in a Principal-Agent Model, *Schmalenbachs Business Review*, Vol. 57, pp. 234-246.

61. Feess, E. (2005). Bosman und die Folgen - was lernen wir aus der Empirie? *Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht*, Vol. 2, pp. 365-377.
62. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2004). Optimal Law Enforcement and Self-Reporting when there are Criminal Teams, *Economica*, Vol. 71, pp. 703-710.
63. Feess, E. and Walzl, M. (2004). Delegated Expertise – When are Good Projects Bad News? *Economics Letters*, Vol. 82, pp. 77-82.
64. Feess, E. (2003). Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football, *European Economic Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 645-668.
65. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2003). The Impact of Transfer Fees on Professional Sports: An Analysis of the New Transfer System for European Football, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 105, pp. 139-154.
66. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Economic Consequences of Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, pp. 221-237.
67. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2003). Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure and Financial Responsibility, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 23, pp. 323-339.
68. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2002). Safety Regulation and Monitor Liability, *Review of Economic Design*, Vol.7, pp. 173-185.
69. Feess, E. and Heesen, E. (2002). Self-Reporting with Ex-Post Asymmetric Information, *Journal of Economics*, Vol. 77(2), pp. 141-153.
70. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve, *Environmental and Resource Economics*, Vol. 23, pp. 149-166.
71. Feess, E. and Nell, M. (2002). Independent Safety Controls with Moral Hazard, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 158(3), pp. 408-419.
72. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2002). Auswirkungen des neuen Transfersystems auf den europäischen Fussball: Eine mikroökonomische Analyse, *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftslehre*, Vol. 4, pp. 143-162.
73. Feess, E., Ewert, R. and Nell, M. (2000). Auditor Liability Rules under Imperfect Information and Costly Litigation, *European Accounting Review*, Vol. 9(3), pp. 371-385.
74. Feess, E., Ewert, R. and Nell, M. (2000). Prüfungsqualität, Dritthaftung und Versicherung, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis*, Vol. 6, pp. 158-172.
75. Feess, E. and Taistra, G. (2000). The Porter Hypothesis on Environmental Policy in an Oligopoly Model with Cost Asymmetry Caused by Innovation, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 220/0.
76. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (2000). Settling Multiparty Accidents under Incomplete Information, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 20, pp. 255-324.
77. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (2000). Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility, *Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance*, Vol. 25(2), pp. 220-234.
78. Feess, E. (1999). Lender Liability for Environmental Harm - an Argument Against Negligence Rules, *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 8, pp. 231-250.
79. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (1999). The Role of Insurance in the Adjudication of Multi-Party Accidents, *International Review of Law and Economics*, Vol. 19(1), pp. 69-86.
80. Feess, E. and Mühlheuser, G. (1999). Strategic Environmental Policy and the Learning Curve- the Significance of the Environmental Industry, *Review of Economics*, Vol. 50, pp. 178-194.
81. Feess, E. and Seeliger (1999). Konsequenzen eines Ausstiegs aus der Kernenergie – Ein Kritischer Vergleich vorhandener Studien, *Zeitschrift für angewandte Umweltforschung*, Vol.12, pp. 400-407.

82. Feess, E. and Hege, U. (1998). Efficient Liability Rules for Multi-Party Accidents with Moral Hazard, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, Vol. 154(2), pp. 421-450.
83. Feess, E. (1998). Marx on Ricardo - An Explanation of some Important Misunderstandings, *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, Vol. 5(2), pp. 276-291.
84. Feess, E. and Stocker, A. (1998). Handelbare Emissionsrechte und Joint Implementation als komplementäre Instrumente gegen den Treibhauseffekt, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht*, Vol. 2, pp. 145-160.
85. Feess, E. (July, 1997). Strukturelles Defizit und konjunktureller Impuls im Konzept des Sachverständigenrats - einige kritische Anmerkungen, *Wirtschaftsdienst*.
86. Feess, E. (1995). Das Umwelthaftungsgesetz bei alternativer Kausalität, *Review of Economics*, Vol. 46, pp. 184-211.
87. Feess, E., Steger, U. and Weihrauch, P. (1991). Strategien zur Reduktion der Umweltbelastungen durch Einwegverpackungen. Eine Kritik der Verpackungsverordnung vom Mai 1991, *Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht* Vol. 4, pp. 349-378.

Monographs

1. Umweltökonomie und -politik, vierte stark erweiterte und komplett überarbeitete Auflage, München 2013: Vahlen.
2. Mikroökonomie. Eine spieltheoretisch- und anwendungsorientierte Darstellung, 3. Auflage, Marburg 2004: Metropolis.
3. Kompaktstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 12: "Wirtschaftspolitik", München 1997: Vahlen (with F. Tibitanzl).
4. Mikroökonomie. Eine Einführung in die neoklassische und klassisch-neoricardianische Preis- und Verteilungstheorie, 3. verbesserte Auflage, Marburg 1994: Metropolis.
5. Kompaktstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 1: "Mikroökonomie", 3. Auflage, München 2000: Vahlen (with F. Tibitanzl).
6. Kompaktstudium Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 2: "Makroökonomie", 3. Auflage, München 2000: Vahlen (with F. Tibitanzl).
7. Die Haftung von Kreditgebern für Umweltschäden, Marburg 1997: Metropolis.
8. Haftungsregeln für multikausale Umweltschäden. Eine ökonomische Analyse des Umwelthaftungsgesetzes, Marburg 1995: Metropolis.
9. Umwelthaftungsrecht. Bestandsaufnahme, Probleme, Perspektiven der Reform des Umwelthaftungsrechts, 2. verbesserte und aktualisierte Auflage, Wiesbaden 1992: Gabler (mit G. Prätorius and U. Steger).
10. Muss Verpackung Abfall sein? Strategien zur Reduktion der Umweltbelastungen durch Einwegverpackungen, Wiesbaden 1991: Gabler (mit U. Steger and P. Weihrauch)
11. Die Redundanz der Mehrwerttheorie, Marburg 1988: Metropolis.

Articles in Books

1. Kausalität und Verschulden, in: Theorie und Geschichte der Wirtschaft, Festschrift für Bertram Schefold, Marburg 2008, pp. 297-314.

2. Einige Überlegungen zur Haftung bei reinen Vermögensschäden, in: Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse, Festschrift für Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Wiesbaden 2008, pp. 141-158.
3. Sustainable Development und Rahmenbedingungen, in: U. Steger, Handbuch des integrierten Umweltmanagements, München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Lehr- und Handbücher der ökologischen Unternehmensführung und Umweltökonomie (Hrsg. Dr. Carlo Burschel).
4. Umweltpolitik als außenpolitische und globale Gestaltungsaufgabe, in: Kaiser, K./Krause, J., Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, München 1996: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Bd. 3 "Interessen und Strategien" (mit U. Steger).
5. Umwelt und strategische Handelspolitik, in: European Business School/Schloß Reichartshausen, Erfahrung - Bewegung - Strategie, Wiesbaden 1996: DUV, Dt. Univ. Verl., Bd. 3.
6. Umwelt und Strategische Handelspolitik, in: Steger, U. (Hrsg.), Globalisierung der Wirtschaft. Konsequenzen für Arbeit, Technik und Umwelt, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York 1996, pp. 144 ff.
7. Umweltschutz durch Haftung und Auditing aus ökonomischer Sicht, in: Nicklisch, F. (Hrsg.), Umweltschutz und Umweltprivatrecht im deutschen und europäischen Recht. Heidelberger Kolloquium: Technologie und Recht 1994; Nürnberg 1995, pp. 175 ff. (mit U. Steger).
8. Aktuelle Tendenzen im Umweltrecht und ihre Auswirkungen auf Unternehmen, in: Kreikebaum, H. (Hrsg.): Unternehmenserfolg durch Umweltschutz. Rahmenbedingungen, Instrumente, Praxisbeispiele, Wiesbaden 1994, pp. 83 - 101 (mit mit H. Hohmann).
9. Ausbildungsinhalte ökologischer Orientierung in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre - Stand, Tendenzen und Praxisrelevanz, in: Kreikebaum, H. (Hrsg.): Unternehmenserfolg durch Umweltschutz. Rahmenbedingungen, Instrumente, Praxisbeispiele, Wiesbaden 1994, pp. 71 – 81.
10. Dezentralisierung bei Multikausalität, in: Rationalisierungskuratorium der Wirtschaft (Hrsg.): Tagungsband zu den Umweltrechtstagen in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1994.
11. Sustainable Development - Nachhaltige und dauerhafte Entwicklung: Ein ökologisch relevantes und wirksames Leitbild ökonomischer Entscheidungen?, in: Steger, U./Timmermann (Hrsg.): Mehr Ökologie durch Ökonomie, Berlin u.a. 1993: Springer, S. 93-120 (mit U. Steger und P. Weihrauch).
12. Aufgaben von Versicherungen im Umweltschutz, in: Handbuch des Umweltmanagements, Kapitel 32, München 1992: Vahlen.
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14. Mehrwegsysteme in der Getränkedistribution, Teil II, in: Getränkefachgroßhandel 10/1988, S. 30-36 (mit U. Steger).
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